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By Craig Holman t and Joan Claybrooktt
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) represents a major
change in federal campaign finance law, preserving the integrity of existing
contribution limits by placing limits on "soft money" in federal elections. The
BCRA, and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, which upheld it, will
have significant effects on the role of non-profit organizations in federal
elections. As the BCRA now limits the use of soft money by state and national
political parties, much of this money will be channeled to such non-profit
groups.
This Policy Essay examines this aftermath of the BCRA and argues that the
renewed role of non-profit organizations in federal elections undermines the
goals of the BCRA. If soft money that would otherwise go to political parties is
instead directed to non-profit political advocacy groups, then its corrupting
influence may continue despite the efforts of the BCRA. But this Policy Essay
argues that McConnell provides constitutional guidelines for how to limit this
loophole and recognize the promise of campaign finance reform.
f Craig Holman, Legislative Representative, Public Citizen's Congress Watch.
tt Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen.
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Outside Groups and Campaign Finance
"We are under no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional statement
on the matter. Money, like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will
arise, and how Congress will respond, are concerns for another day."
-McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 124 S. Ct. 619, 706 (2003)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)1 represents the
most sweeping federal campaign finance legislation since the mid-1970s. The
law, sponsored by Senators John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Russell Feingold (D-
Wis.) and Representatives Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) and Marty Meehan (D-
Mass.), was the culmination of seven years' worth of legislative fighting to
close gaping loopholes in the federal campaign finance law.
The primary purpose of the law is to preserve the integrity of existing
contribution limits in federal campaigns-limits that had been rendered
meaningless over the last decade in the real world of politics. On the books,
federal campaign finance law had prohibited-and still prohibits-
contributions from corporate and union treasuries and had limited the size of
2contributions to $1,000 per individual per election. In reality, however,
corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals pumped about $500 million in
"soft money" into federal elections in the 2000 election cycle--on top of the
"legal" campaign funds raised within the contribution and source limitations.
3
Immediately after the law was signed into effect by President George W.
Bush on March 27, 2002, BCRA was challenged in court by eighty-four
plaintiffs filing eleven separate lawsuits. All the lawsuits were consolidated
into one case, McConnell v. FEC, which was named after the lead
congressional opponent.4
1. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.,
28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
2. Under the leadership of President Theodore Roosevelt, the Tillman Act of 1907 banned
corporate campaign contributions to candidate and party committees in federal elections. Decades later,
in the 1930s, conservative officeholders became concerned that the expansion of the federal workforce
under President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal would lead to the creation of a large, new labor group
working for a liberal Democratic party. As a result, Congress passed the Hatch Act of 1939, named after
Senator Carl Hatch (D-N.M.), which extended earlier prohibitions against political activity by federal
employees, including solicitation of political contributions. As labor unions continued to play a
significant role in Democratic party politics, Congress finally passed the 1943 War Labor Disputes Act
(Smith-Connally Act) over Roosevelt's veto. The Smith-Connally Act barred direct contributions from
union treasuries to federal candidates. This restriction was renewed permanently in 1947 as the Taft-
Hartley Act. In the 1970s, the prohibition on corporate and union treasury money in federal elections
became codified, along with a $1,000 limit on contributions from individuals, in the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a),
44lb(a) (2000)).
3. Press Release, Fed. Election Comm'n, Party Fundraising Reaches $1.1 Billion in
2002 Election Cycle, (Dec. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2002/20021218party/20021218party.html.
4. The first lawsuit was filed by the National Rifle Association (NRA), which, according to
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Together, BCRA and the McConnell decision have fundamentally
transformed the campaign finance environment in federal (and soon, state5)
elections. Among the most significant impacts of the law and its constitutional
precedent is on the role of non-profit organizations in the election arena. Non-
profit groups have suddenly become willing conduits for continuing the flow of
"soft money"-funds received directly from corporate or union treasuries in
excess of the contribution limits-that had previously gone to the national and
state parties.
This Policy Essay examines to what extent the newly energized role of
Section 527s and 501(c) non-profit organizations6 in federal elections has
undermined the objectives of BCRA, particularly the law's attempt to curtail
the corrupting influence of soft money.
Part I of this Policy Essay describes the old campaign finance regime under
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and documents how the rise of soft
money and electioneering issue advocacy rendered the law virtually moot. The
second Part provides a brief synopsis of BCRA and discusses the significance
of the McConnell decision. Part III then notes the legal structures and
limitations of non-profit groups in federal elections and charts the extent to
which these groups have benefited from and are using the new campaign
finance environment. Finally, the Policy Essay concludes by assessing the
evolving role of non-profit groups in elections and their significance for
campaign finance reform, arguing that non-profit groups may well become the
lead soft money players in federal elections, but that there are constitutional
opportunities to rein in this new potential loophole in the campaign finance
regime.
II. THE RISE OF ELECTIONEERING ISSUE ADVOCACY AND
THE "MAGIC WORDS" TEST
After decades of lax enforcement of federal campaign financing laws,
standard court protocol, should have established the name of the case as NRA v. Federal Election
Commission. However, the court adjusted the official name of the case to McConnell in deference to the
wishes of the plaintiffs. Ironically, because of the name change, "McConnell" is the term now used to
describe the constitutional precedent in favor of strict limits on the financing of campaigns.
5. Although BCRA has some immediate impact on campaign finance in state and local elections,
such as the Levin Amendment's ban on state party committees receiving and spending more than
$10,000 each on activities that affect any election in which a federal candidate is on the ballot, a more
significant impact of BCRA on the states is likely to be in paving the way for comparable state
campaign finance laws. As of this writing, reform groups are already considering soft money bans
and/or electioneering communications restrictions for regulating state elections in Alabama, Georgia,
Oregon and Wisconsin.
6. Section 527 groups and 501(c) organizations are two classes of non-profit organizations
registered with the Internal Revenue Service. See I.R.C. §§ 501, 527 (2000). These organizations are
distinct from "political committees" registered with the Federal Election Commission in that they are not
supposed to have as their major purpose campaigning for or against federal candidates. For further
discussion of the distinction between federal campaign finance law and the tax code, see Appendix A.
238
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Congress renewed its determination to regulate money in politics in the early
1970s. Suspicions of financial abuses broke into outright criminal charges
against President Richard Nixon with the Watergate scandal which, in turn,
prompted Congress to strengthen campaign finance regulations by passing the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and its 1974 amendments.
7
The law imposed a variety of disclosure requirements, contribution limits and
spending ceilings on all candidates, parties, and groups.
8
When the Supreme Court considered FECA and its amendments in Buckley
v. Valeo,9 it found several of the Act's provisions regulating expenditures
unconstitutional. Specifically, the Court found Congress's language, which
regulated all expenditures by parties and groups relative to a "clearly identified
candidate" and for the purpose of influencing an election, to be overly broad,
threatening to chill the speech of these groups.' 0 In an attempt to salvage the
disclosure provisions and source limitations for election advertising, the Court
narrowed FECA's broad language regulating party and group expenditures
relative to a "clearly identified candidate" to apply only to those expenditures
that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. I
Without the benefit of empirical evidence or experience in actual campaign
practices, the Court opined that the distinction between "campaign
advertising," which is subject to regulation, and "issue advocacy," which is not,
can logically be drawn by assessing whether the ad "in express terms
advocate[s] the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal
office."' 2 In the now-famous footnote 52 of the Buckley opinion, the Court
named eight examples that constituted "express words of advocacy." These
were: "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for
Congress," "vote against," "defeat," and "reject.' 3 Without these words of
express advocacy or something comparable, 14 ads by parties and groups would
7. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000).
8. For a discussion of the early FECA, see HERBERT ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECTION
(1979).
9. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
10. Id.at44-45.
11. GLENN MORAMARCO, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REGULATING ELECTIONEERING:
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN "EXPRESS ADVOCACY" AND "ISSUE ADVOCACY" 6 (1998).
12. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
13. Id. at 44 n.52. The Court recognized that using such a "magic words" standard of express
advocacy was untested at the time and could conceivably be subject to abuse. In its Buckley decision, the
Court lamented: "It would naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and
groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures
that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the
candidate's campaign." Id. at 45.
14. Some subsequent court decisions have expanded the list of words of express advocacy. For
example, one court extended the express advocacy test to include the essential nature of the message
when read as a whole. In Federal Election Commission v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987), the
Ninth Circuit determined that an ad sharply critical of President Jimmy Carter, which asserted that "if he
succeeds [in reelection] the country will be burdened with four more years of incoherencies, ineptness
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be viewed as educational rather than electioneering in nature, and thus would
not be subject to regulation. This distinction between educational and campaign
advertising, established in practice since the Anti-Saloon League's reluctance
to disclose its financial activities in the 1920s, had now received the Court's
legal sanction.' 
5
A. "Magic Words" Standard
This standard for distinguishing between campaign advertisements and
issue advertisements became known as the "magic words" test. Advertisements
that expressly advocated the election or defeat of candidates were subject to the
source prohibitions, contribution limits, and reporting requirements of FECA.
Political advertisements that avoided the magic words, but focused on
candidates anyway, were classified as "issue ads" immune from federal
campaign finance regulation. Electioneering issue ads could therefore be
financed by soft money and the sources of the funds not disclosed to the
public. 16
By the 2000 federal elections, the issue advocacy and soft money loopholes
rendered the regulatory regime of FECA virtually meaningless. The national
parties were raising and spending $500 million in soft money, primarily to pay
for television "issue ads" promoting or attacking federal candidates without
using the magic words of express advocacy.' 7 Special interest groups followed
suit and began a wave of their own broadcast electioneering issue ads without
anything more than cursory disclosure requirements-such as "Paid for by the
Good Government Committee"-placed on the televised ads themselves. 18
and illusion... DON'T LET HIM DO IT," constituted express advocacy. In another decision by the
Supreme Court, Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1980), a pamphlet that encouraged readers to "vote pro-life" was deemed electioneering in nature
subject to the disclosure requirements of federal law. Other court decisions have continued to adhere to
the specific examples of words of express advocacy offered in footnote 52 as the appropriate standard
for distinguishing campaign ads from issue ads. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Christian Action
Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997).
15. The problem of distinguishing which type of political activity is electioneering and which type
is merely meant to promote issues emerged early in the debate to reform campaign financing. The Anti-
Saloon League, formed in the late 1800s to promote Prohibition, had become an effective political force
in American politics, lobbying officeholders in Capitol Hill, publishing leaflets, and campaigning for
and against congressional candidates. In 1926, the U.S. Senate launched an investigation into the
League's campaign activities. The League responded that its activities did not fall under federal
campaign finance disclosure laws because they were "educational, scientific, and charitable rather than
political as intended by law." CRAIG HOLMAN & LUKE McLOUGHLIN, BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION
ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 24 (2001).
16. See, e.g., id at 23.
17. Id. at 60-68. Although the Buckley decision permitted the national parties to raise and spend
unlimited soft money on electioneering issue ads, FEC regulations required that the parties disclose their
soft money accounts to the public. Interest groups, on the other hand, fell outside the disclosure
requirements of FECA. 11 C.F.R. § 104.8(e)-(f) (2000), superseded by Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
18. In addition to being confused by independent groups using nondescript names in their
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Consequently, television ads, such as the "Don't Be Gored" ad sponsored
by Americans for Job Security in the 2000 general election, aired entirely
outside federal campaign finance regulation. The ad explicitly attacked
Democratic candidate Al Gore for proposing a tax increase on gasoline and
aired shortly before the election in key competitive states. But instead of using
the magic words of express advocacy, the ad-in order to avoid regulation-
concluded "Don't be Gored at the gas pump."'
19
B. Buying Time 2000
In a study on political television advertising in the 2000 federal elections,
the Brennan Center at New York University documented how pervasive and
abusive the issue ad/soft money loophole had become. 20 Known as the "Buying
Time" study, researchers compiled a database of nearly all political television
commercials aired in the 2000 general election. The commercials were
captured by the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG), largely by tapping
into an old Navy satellite that had previously been used to monitor Soviet
submarines diaring the Cold War. The ads were then coded for content by a
team of students at the University of Wisconsin under the direction of Professor
Kenneth Goldstein.
In federal elections only, a total of 2871 unique ads were aired 845,923
times at an estimated cost of $628,655,572. The greatest share of these airings
21occurred in the few months immediately prior to the general election.
Over all elections in 2000 combined, candidates were the principal sponsors
of most political television ads, with party committees running second and
independent groups third.22 Parties played virtually no role in primary elections,
but became a critical player in the general election at all levels-House, Senate
and Presidential.23 There was, however, one very important caveat to this
overall trend: for the first time in recent history, political advertising by parties
and groups outspent political ads by candidates in the 2000 presidential general
disclosure lines and frequently falling outside financial activity reporting requirements, viewers often
confuse group-sponsored ads for candidate-sponsored ads because of the lax disclosure requirements.
See generally ELECTION ADVOCACY: SOFT MONEY AND ISSUE ADVOCACY IN THE 2000
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (David Magleby ed.), at http://csed.byu.edu/index.jsp (last updated Dec.
17, 2003).
19. Overlaying unflattering images of Al Gore and high prices at the gas pump, the announcer
ominously intoned:
Are you taxed enough already? Not according to Al Gore. Gore plans to squeeze more money
out of middle class families at the gasoline pump. Gore cast the tie-breaking vote to raise gas
taxes 4.3 cents a gallon. He admits he'll add more taxes on gasoline with what he calls a C02
tax. Gore supported a call to raise taxes so much that gas would cost $3 a gallon. And Gore's
ideas are so extreme. If they ever came to pass, Americans would truly be Gored at the pump.
20. HOLMAN & MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 15.
21. Id. at 52-53.
22. Id. at 29.
23. Id.
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election. 24 In other words, political players other than candidates were primarily
responsible for determining which issues were discussed and which candidate
images were seen on the television airwaves.
25
Although group-sponsored ads were not as prominent as candidate and
party ads in the 2000 federal elections, they were rapidly gaining ground. In a
matter of just a few years, issue advocacy had come on the political scene with
a vengeance. Issue advocacy largely became a concern in the 1996 presidential
election, spiraled in use in the 1998 congressional elections, and increased six-
fold two years later. In the 2000 election, there were 142,421 airings of political
television ads sponsored by independent groups at a cost conservatively
estimated above $98 million.
2 6
These ads were campaign ads by any standard, except by the magic words
standard. FECA, interpreted in the Buckley decision as applicable only to
express advocacy communications, became irrelevant to the real world of
campaign activity promoting the election or defeat of federal candidates. Soft
money could, and did, become the principal source of funds to pay for these
campaign ads.
C. Soft Money
In the late 1970s, Congress amended FECA to allow the national parties to
finance some party-building activities with "soft money. ' '27 Soft money-
money in federal elections that would otherwise be illegal, such as direct
corporate or union contributions or contributions in excess of legal limits-was
then seen as a potential source of revenues to bolster non-electioneering party
activities, and to place parties on par with the rising campaign activity of
independent groups. Fearful that campaign finance regulations disadvantaged
political parties in relation to outside independent groups, who could spend
unlimited treasury funds for issue advocacy, Congress sought to strengthen the
parties by permitting them to receive and spend those same corporate and union
28treasury funds for party-building activities.
Prior to implementation of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), the national and state parties made direct appeals to wealthy
individuals, corporations, and unions for soft money contributions to the
24. Press Release, Brennan Ctr. For Justice, 2000 Presidential Race First in Modem History Where
Political Parties Spend More on TV Ads than Candidates (Dec. 11, 2000), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2000/pressrelease_2000_1 21 icmag.html.
25. Of the $163,129,637 spent on TV advertising in the presidential elections of 2000, candidates
spent $67,116,919, parties spent $79,894,799, and other groups spent $16,117,919. Id.
26. HOLMAN & McLOUGHLIN, supra note 15, at 20. In the 1998 congressional elections, groups
spent about $11 million to air 21,712 television ads. Id.
27. See FINANCING THE 2000 ELECTION 4 (David Magleby ed., 2002).
28. Id.
Vol. 22:235, 2004
Outside Groups and Campaign Finance
parties. In the 2002 election cycle, national and congressional party committees
broke all previous records in soft money fundraising and, for the first time,
Democratic party committees were on par with Republican party committees in
terms of raising and spending soft money.29 These national committee soft
money expenditures were for many political purposes, not just television
advertising. This was a banner year for soft money, which totaled more than
five times the amounts raised and spent in 1992.' 0
Research, however, showed that soft money was rarely used for its intended
get-out-the-vote and party-building purposes. Only eight and one-half cents out
of every soft money dollar were spent by the parties on activities associated
with mobilizing voters, such as get-out-the vote drives, party registration
efforts, absentee ballot mailings, party slate mailings, phone banks, and other
activities intended to fortify a party's electoral base. By far, the single greatest
share of soft money dollars spent by the parties relative to federal elections
went into electioneering "issue" advertising for or against candidates.
31
III. BCRA AND THE MCCONNELL DECISION
Under tremendous public pressure, Congress and the President relented to
the reform movement and passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA),32 also known as the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law, when
the Senate was controlled by the Democrats. Briefly, the two key pillars of
BCRA are (1) a ban on soft money fundraising and spending by candidates and
parties in federal elections; and (2) a redefinition of campaign ads to include
broadcast ads that mention a candidate, target the candidate's election district,
and air within thirty days of a primary election or sixty days of a general
election. The act banned soft money donations to the national parties and
federal officeholders, 33 and ads that are designed to promote the election or
defeat of candidates are to be considered campaign ads, subject to contribution
limits and disclosure requirements.
34
BCRA sharply curtailed the role of soft money in federal elections. Most of
the provisions of the new campaign finance law went into effect on November
29. National Republican party committees raised $250.0 million in soft money and
spent $258.1 million in soft money, while national Democratic party committees raised $245.9
million in soft money and spent $249.9 million. See Press Release, Fed. Election Comm'n,
Non-federal Summary, 1992-2002 (Dec. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2002/20021218party/nonfederalsummary.xls.
30. Id.
31. Some 37.8% of federal soft money went to media "issue advertising," compared to 18.1% for
administration, 15.4% for fundraising, 14.3% for salaries, 8.5% for voter mobilization, 3.5% for general
mail, and 2.4% for consultants. HOLMAN & McLOUGHLIN, supra note 15, at 67.
32. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C.,
28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
33. Id. §101, 116Stat. at82-86.
34. Id. §§ 201-204, 116 Stat. at 88-92.
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6, 2002. 35 Federal officeholders and candidates and the national parties are now
prohibited from raising or spending soft money in most instances. As part of a
congressional compromise, however, entities may contribute up to $10,000 in
soft money (known as Levin funds) to each state and local party organization, if
permitted by state law, that may be spent for voter mobilization activity in
federal elections. 36 Additionally, the Federal Election Commission has
promulgated a series of regulations to loosen the soft money ban somewhat,
37
much to the consternation of the congressional sponsors, who have filed a
lawsuit in response.
38
BCRA also provides a new definition of campaign ad, as differentiated
from an issue ad.39 The law retains the magic words standard as well as the
concept that any advertisement sponsored by a candidate is a campaign ad. But
it also imposes a "bright-line standard" in which any broadcast advertisement
that depicts a candidate within thirty days of a primary election or sixty days of
a general election, and is targeted to the voting constituency of that candidate,
constitutes an "electioneering communication" subject to federal campaign
laws.
40
In a sweeping victory for campaign finance reform, the U.S. Supreme Court
in McConnell v. FEC41 upheld nearly all elements of BCRA. In a 5-to-4
decision, the majority of the Court ruled:
[T]he statute's two principal, complementary features-Congress' effort to plug the
soft money loophole and its regulation of electioneering communications-must be
upheld in the main.
42
The majority opinion, written by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, upheld
the two key provisions of the campaign finance law: the ban on soft money in
federal elections, and the regulation of campaign advertisements disguised as
"issue ads.' '43 More than that, the Court upheld nearly every element of BCRA
and did so in a tone that will be interpreted as a strong endorsement of a strict
campaign finance regulatory regime. For example, the Court majority clearly
35. Id. § 402, 116 Stat, at 112-113.
36. Id. § 102, 116 Stat. at 86-87.
37. Some of the contested regulations are 11 C.F.R. § 300.52 (officeholders participating in
fundraising); 11 C.F.R. § 100.5 (definition of political committee); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29 (content standard
as measure of coordination); 11 C.F.R. § 100.24 (definition of federal election activity); 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.133 (voter registration activities); and 11 C.F.R. § 106.5 (allocation of expenditures).
38. Shays v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 02-CV-1984 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 8, 2003). On October 8,
2003, Congressmen Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) and Marty Meehan (D-Mass.), two of the principal
sponsors of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia to have the soft money and coordination rules the FEC adopted to implement Title I and parts
of Title II of the Act reversed. The suit alleges that the FEC acted "arbitrarily and capriciously" in its
rulemaking by opening numerous loopholes through which soft money can still be raised and spent.
39. BCRA §§ 201-204.
40. Id.
41. 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003)
42. Id. at 627.
43. Id.
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acknowledged that soft money was being used to finance campaign
advertisements and not for party-building activities and voter mobilization
when it said:
The record here reflects that corporations and unions used soft money to finance a
virtual torrent of televised election-related ads during the relevant period. Congress
justifiably concluded that remedial legislation was necessary to stanch that flow of
money.
The Court also recognized that the free flow of soft money to the national
parties was a prescription for corruption, not just the appearance of corruption:
So pervasive is this practice that the six national party committees actually furnish
their own menus of opportunity for access to would-be soft-money donors, with
increased prices reflecting an increased level of access. For example, the
[Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC)] offers a range of donor
options, starting with the $10,000-per-year Business Forum program, and going up
to the $100,000-per-year National Finance Board program. The latter entitles the
donor to bimonthly conference calls with the Democratic House leadership and
chair of the DCCC, complimentary invitations to all DCCC fundraising events, two
private dinners with the Democratic House leadership and ranking members, and
two retreats with the Democratic House leader and DCCC chair in Telluride,
Colorado, and Hyannisport, Massachusetts....
. As the record demonstrates, it is the manner in which parties have sold
access to federal candidates and officeholders that has given rise to the appearance
of undue influence .... It is no surprise then that purchasers of such access
unabashedly admit that they are seeking to purchase just such influence.
45
The Court even admonished the Federal Election Commission for letting
money in politics get so out of hand. FEC regulations, noted the Court, created
the problem of soft money. In the words of the Justices, "the FEC regulations
permitted more than Congress, in enacting FECA, had ever intended. ''46 As
such, BCRA, affirmed by the McConnell decision, has largely removed the
national political parties and federal officeholders from the soft money game.
But the law has not ended the soft money game altogether.
IV. ELECTIONEERING NON-PROFIT GROUPS AND THE TAX CODE
After celebrating passage of the most sweeping campaign finance reform
legislation in over a quarter century, and hailing significant improvements in
the disclosure law covering Section 527 groups, a harsh reality is beginning to
grip the reform community. The two central features of BCRA-the soft
money ban and sham issue ad regulation-are being threatened by an old
conduit in new clothes: non-profit groups. The problem lies in the permissible
electioneering activities of two distinct but related classes of non-profit
44. Id. at 636.
45. Id. at 665-66.
46. Id. at 660 n.44.
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organizations: § 527 groups and § 501(c) non-profit groups. The latter assume
special importance under today's campaign finance regime.
It is critical in attempting to understand the permissible political activities
of non-profit organizations to realize that two different sets of laws regulate
these activities: the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and the Internal
Revenue Code. Both laws use different definitions of "electioneering" activities
and pursue different objectives in regulating organizations.
FECA specifically regulates campaign activity of organizations. In so
doing, FECA operates on a very narrow definition of electioneering activity.
Under FECA, as amended by BCRA, electioneering activity includes:
Express advocacy communications, which employ the "magic words" of "vote for,"
"vote against, "elect" or something comparable; and
Electioneering communications, which depict a federal candidate within sixty days
of a general or runoff election or thirty days before a primary election, and which
target the voting constituency in that election.
47
By contrast, the Internal Revenue Code specifically regulates the tax status
of organizations. As such, the tax code uses a broad definition of electioneering
activity, which is any activity designed to influence the election or appointment
of individuals to federal, state, or local office, or office in a political
organization.48 Electioneering activities for tax purposes include electioneering
issue advocacy and voter mobilization efforts, which commonly are not
included in FECA's definition of electioneering.49
A. Key Categories of Electioneering Non-Profit Groups
The laws apply differently to different classes of organizations. Political
action committees, or PACs, whose activities fall under FECA's definition of
electioneering, must register with the Federal Election Commission and abide
by all the contribution limits and reporting requirements of federal campaign
law. Non-profit groups that avoid the express advocacy or electioneering
communications definitions of FECA, but which pursue other electioneering
47. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81,
88 (2002).
48. For a § 527 organization, electioneering activity is defined as "influencing or attempting to
influence the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or
local public office or office in a political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential
electors, whether or not such individual or electors are selected, nominated, elected or appointed." I.R.C.
§ 527(e)(2) (2002). For a 501(c) non-profit group, "political expenditure" means an expenditure in "any
participation in, or intervention in (including the publication or distribution of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." I.R.C. § 4955(a)(1) (2002).
49. A series of Revenue Rulings from the IRS clarify that facts and circumstances are to be taken
into consideration in determining whether an activity constitutes an "intervention" in a campaign. These
facts and circumstances include such factors as timing of the message, targeting the message, and tone
of the message. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 81-
95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
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activity as their primary purpose, must register with the IRS as Section 527
groups.5 Business, labor and ideological groups that intend to conduct
substantial amounts of electioneering activity, but not as the primary purpose of
the organization, may register with the IRS as 501(c) non-profit tax exempt
groups. This entitles them to dramatically reduced disclosure requirements
compared to what is imposed on Section 527's groups. Finally, groups that do
not plan on conducting substantial lobbying and electioneering activity may
register as 501(c)(3) charities, entitled to generous tax benefits for the
contribution to the organization. 52 All these classes of non-profit groups file
their financial activity reports with the IRS and not the FEC, no matter what
their level of electioneering activity.
5 3
1. Section 527s
The tax code established 527 groups so that a group may engage in
electioneering activities without jeopardizing its tax exempt status. As a result,
it had been the favorite vehicle for special interest groups seeking to influence
federal elections, especially prior to the 527-disclosure law of 2000 and
subsequent disclosure improvements in 2002. 54 Special interest group 527s are
founded and sponsored by many types of entities--corporations, unions,
advocacy groups on the right and left, and individuals seeking to determine the
outcome of elections. They are most known for pumping huge sums of money
into elections to put up electioneering ads on TV and radio. But increasingly
they are operating "ground wars," large direct mail and telemarketing efforts,
as well as voter identification and get out the vote operations. They can even be
used to pay for the administrative costs of running a PAC, which raises hard
money that can then be used to purchase campaign advertisements.
55
Section 527s are no longer the "stealth PACs" of yore. Congress approved a
law in July 2000 requiring all 527s to file regular financial disclosure reports
with the IRS. The disclosure requirements applicable to 527s were improved
even further with passage of the Brady-Lieberman disclosure law in 2002,
which became effective in July 2003. Among its most important provisions, the
law requires § 527 groups to file regular reports with much of the same
disclosure information that is required of FECA-regulated political committees,
50. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (2002).
51. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)-(6) (2002).
52. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2002).
53. See Appendix A, Permissible Political Activities of PACs and Non-Profit Groups Under FECA
and the Tax Code.
54. Act of July 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (amending requirement of 527
organizations to disclose their political activities); Income Tax Notification and Return Requirements-
Political Committees of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-276, 116 Stat. 1929.
55. See Richard Komylak, Disclosing the Election-Related Activities of Interest Groups Through
§ 527 of the Tax Code, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 230 (2001).
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and the reports must be filed electronically and made easily available on the
IRS Web site in a searchable and downloadable format.
2. 501(c) Non-Profits
The disclosure requirements for 527s do not apply to 501(c) non-profit
organizations. Instead, 501(c) non-profits could become the new "stealth
PACs" of choice for soft money operatives wishing to evade campaign finance
disclosure laws. As permitted under the tax code, with no regulations to the
contrary under federal campaign finance law, non-profits may conduct
substantial electioneering activities, and can pay for these activities with soft
money.56 Although these groups may not engage in express advocacy or
electioneering communications (as defined by BCRA) without registering with
the FEC, the reporting and disclosure requirements for all other electioneering
activity by non-profits, unlike for § 527 groups, are rudimentary. On their
annual Form 990 disclosure reports, the groups only have to list gross receipts
and expenditures in a handful of categories.57 There is no detailed information
that is publicly disclosed about who the individual contributors are or how
much the group spends on television ads, direct mail, telemarketing or other
activities. Moreover, the little information that is disclosed is not done in a
timely fashion. The groups, for example, do not have to provide regular reports
to the IRS during election season. They simply are required to file their Form
990 with the IRS within four and one-half months after their fiscal year ends.
58
This is routinely extended an extra six months, which usually puts this limited
reporting well past the final election. It can even be difficult to get a group's
limited report, often requiring a written request or a trip to the organization's
headquarters.
59
Not only are the disclosure laws weaker for 501(c) non-profits than for 527
groups, but BCRA's ban on soft money fundraising by federal officials does
not even apply to 501(c) non-profit groups. On the premise that non-profits are
not primarily electioneering entities, BCRA allows federal officials to solicit
unlimited soft money for non-profit groups whether or not the group conducts
substantial electioneering activity.
B. The Posturing of Non-Profit Groups
BCRA proponents have been startled by the extent to which national party
leaders and federal officeholders are clinging to maintain control over the flow
56. For a discussion of permissible political activities by 501(c) non-profits, see Rev. Rul.
2004-6, 2004-4 I.R.B. 328.
57. I.R.S. Form 990 and Form 990-EZ Instructions (2003).
58. Id. at 6.
59. Only reports for 501(c)(3) groups are available on the web at www.guidestar.org.
Vol. 22:235, 2004
Outside Groups and Campaign Finance
of soft money through electioneering non-profit organizations. This is made
possible in part by a dramatic and bold rebuke to BCRA in an FEC rulemaking,
which, at the time this Policy Essay went to press, was being challenged in
court.6 1 As part of its controversial rulemaking, the FEC decided to grandfather
in groups set up prior to November 6, 2002 by the leaders of the national
parties by assuming that the new groups are not coordinating activities with the
62parties. As a result, federal officeholders and party leaders have established
and financed numerous new non-profits-both § 527 and 501(c) non-profit
groups-specifically for the purpose of resuming banned soft money operations
in federal elections. Such 527 groups include the Leadership Forum, created on
November 4, 2002 by the National Republican Congressional Committee with
a $1 million transfer in party funds, and the Democratic Majority Senate
PAC-Non-Federal Account, formed on the same day by the Democratic
Senate Majority PAC-Federal Account, and staffed by a former aide to Al
Gore.
63
The explicit purpose of many of these new "unaffiliated" 527 groups is to
pick up where the national parties and federal officeholders left off-that is, to
raise huge sums of soft money from corporations, unions, and wealthy
individuals and to pump that money into electioneering issue ads (which can
run up to sixty days before a general election) promoting and attacking
candidates.64 They are staffed by the same people who worked with the
national parties and congressional caucuses, maintain the same connections,
and carry the same electoral objectives. In addition to the 527 groups, many
additional shadow committees have been established as 501(c) non-profit
groups, but registration records of most of these organizations are not readily
available.
Just as ominous for the spirit of BCRA is the expressed concerted effort by
progressive groups, labor unions, and wealthy individuals to fund a massive
electioneering non-profit drive specifically to oppose the presidential re-
election of George Bush. Alarmed by the hard money fundraising prowess of
the Bush campaign-expected to raise and spend $200 million in the 2004
primaries alone, possibly triple the amount of the closest Democratic
competitor65-several Democratic-leaning organizations and individuals have
60. Amy Keller, McCain Takes Aim at "Shadow" Groups," ROLL CALL, Nov. 18, 2002, 2002 WL
8127314.
61. Shays v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 02-CV-1984 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 8, 2003).
62. 11 C.F.R. § 110.3.
63. Chris Cillizza, New Democratic PACs Prosper, ROLL CALL, Aug. 4,2003,2003 WL 7691714.
64. Amy Keller, Reform Oriented 527 Teams Up with ACT, ROLL CALL, Feb. 9, 2004, 2004 WL
61550718; Senate Passes Campaign Finance Reform Bill, THE BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER, Mar. 21,
2002.
65. William Schneider, The Internet as ATM, NAT'L J., Oct. 25, 2003; see also
www.WhiteHouseForSale.org.
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committed to raise and spend anywhere between $200 million and $300 million
through non-profits in broadcast advertising before the 60-day window, direct
mail ads, and voter mobilization activities.
66
America Coming Together (ACT), a § 527 group led by Steve Rosenthal,
former political director of the AFL-CIO, and Ellen Malcolm, president of
EMILY's List, is designed to spearhead this effort. Hoping to raise $94 million
in soft money,67 ACT is planning on conducting a massive field effort to
register new Democrats and get them out to vote to "defeat George Bush in
,,682004. ACT's ground war is targeting 17 key states that could help determine
the outcome of the presidential election.
69
ACT also plans to coordinate its efforts with another 527, The Media Fund.
The purpose of The Media Fund is to run broadcast ads supporting the
Democratic presumptive nominee in the period from the primary elections in
March, 2004, through the Democratic convention in July, 2004-after which
the nominee receives a $74 million grant in public funds to pay for the general
election campaign. 70 (George Bush is also expected to re-join the presidential
public financing program for the general election only and accept the $74
million general election grant and spending ceiling. 71)
Partnership for America's Families, a § 527 group also run by Rosenthal,
plans on spending $12 million in soft money for voter mobilization drives in
72urban communities. Voices for Working Families will complement that voter
mobilization drive by focusing on minority voters likely to cast Democratic
ballots.73 America Votes and Grassroots Democrats are two more § 527 groups
intending to raise and spend soft money on behalf of Democratic candidates.
74
If these objectives are realized, much of the soft money that BCRA sought
to eliminate would find its way back into federal elections. Perhaps even more
troubling would be that much of this money would go from the well-disclosed
coffers of the national parties to the more cloaked coffers of the non-profit
community.
66. Eliza Newlin Carney et al., New Rules of the Game, NAT'L J., Dec. 20, 2003, at 3804.
67. Id. at 3803.
68. Thomas Edsall, Liberals Form Fund to Defeat President, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2003, at A3.
69. Carney et. al, supra note 66, at 3803.
70. Press Release, Fed. Election Comm'n, 2004 Presidential Spending Limits Now Available (Mar.
8, 2004), available at http://www.fec.gov.
71. Jill Lawrence & Jim Drinkard, Kerry, Dean Might Forgo Cash, USA TODAY, Sep. 16, 2003, at
1A; see also www.WhiteHouseForSale.org.
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V. CONCLUSION: MAKING BCRA WORK-WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM
MCCONNELL
Section 527s and 501(c) non-profit organizations invariably will play a
larger role in federal elections following the ban on soft money under BCRA.
But it needs to be emphasized that this does not mark a failure of the new
campaign finance regime nor even an unintended consequence.
According to the four primary sponsors of BCRA, reducing the amount of
money in federal elections has never been a primary objective of BCRA. This
is a reform for another day.75 Instead, the primary objectives of BCRA are (2)
to end large contributions from corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals to
the national parties and federal officeholders, where the potential for corruption
is greatest; and (2) to capture the bulk of electioneering issue ads by parties and
independent groups under federal campaign finance law. Both of these
objectives have been largely achieved, even with the FEC attempting to pull the
rug from beneath them.
Soft money may continue to flow into federal elections through non-profit
groups, but non-profits are an arm's length away from officeholders. A
$100,000 soft money contribution to the NRA, for example, is not as likely to
buy a sleep-over in the Lincoln bedroom or other favors as a similar soft money
contribution to the national parties. And even independent groups are subject to
FECA's regulatory regime for so-called issue ads broadcast near an election, at
a time when such ads have their greatest impact on elections.
The congressional floor debate over the campaign finance law shows that it
was widely expected that some additional soft money would move from the
parties to non-profit groups. 76 No one is surprised by this development.
The amount of soft money that may yet flow to electioneering non-profit
groups, however, is surprising. The emergence of shadow parties as
electioneering non-profit groups waging a full-scale second campaign with
non-profits independent of the candidates, flies in the face of the principle of
keeping campaign spending down to reasonable levels.
McConnell provides the means for addressing this problem and others.
Under the prior Buckley precedent, federal election activity subject to
regulation was limited in scope to express advocacy as defined by the magic
words test. McConnell corrects that loophole and vastly expands the
constitutional parameters of the type of activity that may be subject to
regulation. While the type of political activity that may be subject to regulation
75. W. Parker Baxter, Recent Developments in Campaign Finance Law: Implementing the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 589, 591-592 (2002).
76. "The soft money ban in this bill will be more of a temporary road block than a true dead end. I
believe that eventually soft money will find a detour, and it will into federal elections from another
direction." 149 CONG. REC. 539 33-06, S 3240 (2001) (statement of Senator Bill Nelson).
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has been expanded, an important-and positive-constitutional constraint on
the scope of regulation still exists: the limitations of FECA must apply only to
those groups who have influencing federal elections as their "major purpose."
The Court has -repeatedly confirmed this tenet 77 and did not revise it under
McConnell. In the part of Buckley that still governs, the Court ruled that
campaign finance regulations "only encompass organizations that are under the
control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or
election of a candidate.,
78
Section 527 groups have as their primary purpose affecting elections, while
501(c) non-profit groups do not.
Section 527s were born of the express advocacy loophole created by
Buckley. But that loophole may now be closed. Section 527s, which have as
their primary purpose activity to influence federal elections, may appropriately
be captured under FECA's definition of "political committee" subject to
contribution limits and source prohibitions. Ending the exemption of 527s from
federal campaign finance law may arguably be achieved either by statute or
even through simple regulation by the Federal Election Commission. 79 After
McConnell, the constitutional obstacle to regulating the electioneering activities
of these groups whose major purpose is to influence federal elections is no
longer present.
Extending the regulatory regime to capture § 527 political groups must be
accompanied by significant safeguards to ensure that legitimate advocacy work
by other non-profits is not also captured under the regime. These safeguards
would include (1) clarifying that the "major purpose" test for electioneering
activity is sufficiently expansive so as not to capture those groups whose
electioneering activity is ancillary to their primary purpose of advocacy work
77. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986) ("[If an]
organization's major purpose may be regarded as campaign activity, the corporation would be classified
as a political committee.").
78. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976)) (emphasis added).
79. Due to the prodding of the Republican national party, the FEC is considering promulgating new
regulations to extend the contribution limits and disclosure requirements of FECA to § 527 groups that
conduct "federal election activity," defined as any activity that "promotes, supports, attacks or opposes"
a federal candidate at any time. On February 18, 2004, the commission discussed the issue in response to
an advisory opinion request from Americans for a Better Country (ABC), a Republican-leaning PAC
and § 527 group. The advisory opinion finally approved by the commission signaled that the agency
favors some form of stricter regulation of the political activities of § 527s, but noted that the advisory
opinion was not the proper forum for addressing the issue. The commission agreed that the entire issue
of regulating the activities of political committees and non-profit groups must be addressed through the
normal regulatory process, complete with public hearings.
Regulatory proceedings on the issue were initiated on March 1, 2004, with the issuance of Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking 2004-06, "Political Committee Status." Public comments were scheduled for
April 5, 2004, with public hearings to follow within the month. The issue has stirred considerable
controversy. See, e.g., Dan Balz, Democrats Forming Parallel Campaign, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2004,
at IA; Glen Justice, Political Groups Taking on Bush in Ad Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at
IA.
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(e.g. 501(c) non-profit groups); and (2) enhancing the disclosure requirements
for only aggregate expenditure activity of 501(c) non-profit groups (rather than
disclosure of contributors) so that a non-profit group with excessive
electioneering expenditures is flagged for the IRS and the public for further
scrutiny. Regulation of § -527s is likely to push some electioneering shadow
groups who wish to remain cloaked into the 501(c) non-profit community. An
enhanced disclosure system for 501(c) groups could help in weeding out
legitimate advocacy organizations from shadow political operatives for the
parties or candidates.
Such an improved disclosure system for the non-profit community would
not penalize groups with extensive political expenditures-for a substantial
amount of electioneering advertising is permissible for 501(c) groups, and
many or most of these political communications may in fact be deemed genuine
issue advertising-but it would help the IRS flag potential abuses of the tax
code for closer scrutiny under the "facts-and-circumstances" test.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act has saved FECA and preserved the
integrity of the federal campaign finance regulatory regime. The McConnell
decision provides the constitutional framework for curbing electioneering
abuses and preventing political operatives from discovering new loopholes-as
long as the FEC faithfully administers the law.
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Appendix A: Permissible Political Activities of
PACs and Non-Profit Organizations Under Federal
Campaign Finance and Tax Laws
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Lobbying Activity
Continued...
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i. Section 527s and 501(c) non-profits may not have as their "major purpose" independent
expenditures or electioneering communications without assuming PAC status, fully subject to FECA.
ii. The primary purpose standard for a 501(c) can be very broadly stated in the organization's
registration documents and tax filings. In assessing whether an organization's electioneering activities
have exceeded permissible boundaries, the IRS would apply a facts-and-circumstances test. For
example, if a 501(c)(5) labor union ran extensive political ads promoting candidates explicitly because
they are affiliated with the Democratic party, the facts-and-circumstances in this case could warrant a
decision that party affiliation is not a primary purpose of the labor union and thus the ads risk the
union's tax status.
iii. Despite ambiguity, the facts-and-circumstances test for tax exemption status can be
distinguished from the elected expenditure test [501(h) status] in two respects. First, the latter is based
exclusively on expenditures of money, whereas the former looks at expenditures as well as other factors
such as time and effort expended, including the time and effort of unpaid volunteers, and the relative
place of the organization's lobbying activities in its larger agenda. Second, the elected expenditure test
limits grass-roots lobbying to one-fourth of permissible lobbying, whereas the facts-and-circumstances
test makes no distinction between direct and grass-roots lobbying.

